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SURVEY SECTION
Corporate Law. Doe v. Gelineau, 732 A.2d 43 (R.I. 1999). In or-
der for a corporation to be liable for acts beyond the scope of its
corporate character, it is necessary for the plaintiff to produce
enough evidence to support corporate veil piercing liability.
In Doe v. Gelineau,1 the Rhode Island Supreme Court was
asked to determine whether the Roman Catholic Bishop of Provi-
dence (RCB), a corporation sole,2 could be held liable for the al-
leged misconduct of defendant Rhode Island Catholic Orphan
Asylum Corporation d/b/a Saint Aloysius Home (St. Aloysius). 3
The court determined that the plaintiff did not meet its burden of
producing sufficient evidence in order to disregard the corporate
entity of St. Aloysius and impose liability on RCB.4
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Plaintiffs, boys between the ages of five and fifteen at the time
of the alleged misconduct, were placed at St. Aloysius while in the
custody of the State of Rhode Island, Department of Children,
Youth, and Families (DCYF).5 St. Aloysius, a nonprofit corpora-
tion, is a foster-care and treatment facility operated by defendant
Rhode Island Catholic Orphan Asylum Corporation d/b/a Saint Al-
oysius Home. 6 While residing at St. Aloysius, plaintiffs allegedly
suffered physical, emotional and sexual abuse from the alleged
misconduct of certain former St. Aloysius employees and staff
members. 7 The plaintiffs filed complaints against numerous de-
fendants that they alleged were affiliated with St. Aloysius and
thus responsible for the alleged abuse.8 St. Aloysius subsequently
1. 732 A.2d 43 (R.I. 1999).
2. A corporation sole is a "corporation consisting of only one person whose
successor becomes the corporation upon his death or resignation; limited in the
main today to bishops and heads of dioceses." Id. at 45 n.3 (quoting Black's Law
Dictionary 342 (6th ed. 1990)).
3. See Doe, 732 A.2d at 45.
4. See id. at 52.
5. See id. at 45.
6. See id.
7. See id. at 45-46.
8. See id. at 45. The plaintiffs' cases were consolidated by the superior court.
The named defendants included the following individuals and entities:
[RCB,l DCYF; Lina D'Amario Rossi, individually and in her capacity as
the Director of DCYF; Steven Lieberman, individually and in his capacity
as the Assistant Director of DCYF; Kenneth Fandetti, individually and in
his capacity as the Executive Director of DCYF; Carol Spizirri, individu-
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closed on or about January, 1994, when investigations into plain-
tiffs' claims were conducted.9
The defendant, RCB, was created in 1900 as a corporation
sole.10 Through its creation, it was granted property holding and
management functions." At the time of the alleged misconduct at
St. Aloysius, Bishop Louis E. Gelineau (Bishop Gelineau) was the
exclusive officer of RCB. 12 In 1972, RCB ventured beyond its stat-
utorily authorized property holding and management functions
and began to operate various diocesan activities.' 3 These activities
included: operating the diocesan Priests Personnel Office, the Of-
fice of Worship, the Office of Communication, the Building Com-
mission, and the Fiscal Office;' 4 paying the stipends of various
diocesan officials; entering into contracts with certain outside con-
sultants regarding property management of the diocese; and, ac-
counting and legal services. 15
In their complaints, plaintiffs claimed that RCB was liable in
part for plaintiffs' alleged abuse on the basis that RCB was negli-
gent in hiring, retaining and supervising St. Aloysius' staff and its
operation. 16 RCB filed a motion for summary judgment relying on
section 2 of the 1941 Rhode Island Acts & Resolves (the Act).17
RCB argued that as a matter of law it could not be held liable be-
ally and in her capacity as the Assistant Administrator of DCYF; Rhode
Island Catholic Orphan Asylum Corporation d/b/a Saint Aloysius Home
(St. Aloysius); Father Robert McIntyre, the Managing Director of St. Alo-
ysius; and Bishop Louis E. Gelineau, in his capacity as the Chief Adminis-
trative and Operating Officer of the Diocese of Providence (diocese), in his
capacity as the single officer of RCB, and in his capacity as the President,
Treasurer, and Director of St. Aloysius.... RCB is the only defendant
involved in this appeal.
Id. n.4.
9. See id. at 46.
10. See id. See also 1941 R.I. Acts & Resolves, § 1 at 449-51 (outlining the
creation of the corporation sole of the RCB and the powers and authorities of RCB);
1941 R.I. Acts & Resolves, § 2 (describing the property holding and management
functions of RCB).
11. See id.
12. See Doe, 732 A.2d at 46.
13. See id.
14. The Fiscal Office "provided accounting services to some of the corporations




17. See id. See also 1941 R.I. Acts & Resolves, § 2 at 450-51.
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cause the Act limited RCB's powers and liabilities to matters con-
cerning its holding and management of church property.' 8
Therefore, because RCB was not authorized to assign priests to St.
Aloysius, or to discipline or supervise priests assigned there, it
could not be held liable for any alleged wrongdoing at St. Aloys-
ius.19 RCB also averred that it had no role in the funding, opera-
tions, management, and/or supervision of the St. Aloysius staff and
therefore could not be held liable.20
Plaintiffs responded that the purpose of the Act is not to shield
RCB from liability.21 Plaintiffs argued that St. Aloysius' separate
corporate existence should be pierced and liability imposed on RCB
because St. Aloysius was under the ultimate control of RCB.
22
Plaintiffs based this argument on the fact that RCB's sole officer,
Bishop Gelineau, served as the President, Treasurer and Director
of St. Aloysius.23 Plaintiffs failed to produce any evidence that
demonstrated that RCB was involved in any of the hiring, retain-
ing or supervising of St. Aloysius staff and its operations.
The superior court granted RCB's summary judgment mo-
tion.24 The motion justice's decision relied upon the limited enu-
merated powers vested to RCB by the Act.25 The motion justice
found that there was no evidence that RCB was involved in this
case because the allegations went beyond RCB's potential liability
in its statutorily authorized property holding and management ac-
tivities.26 The plaintiffs appealed from the judgment entered by
the superior court.
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The supreme court affirmed the decision of the superior court,
finding that there was not enough evidence in the record to support
18. See Doe, 732 A.2d at 46.







26. See id. Plaintiffs also failed to present any evidence to hold RCB liable
within its statutorily granted powers by, for example, presenting evidence that
"RCB owned the real estate on which St. Aloysius was located or any of the per-
sonal property involved in the operations." Id. at 47 n.8.
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a corporate veil piercing of St. Aloysius and hold RCB liable.27
However, the court did find that the act, which granted RCB its
property holding and management activities, did not shield it from
liability of other misconduct outside of its statutorily granted
powers.
On appeal, plaintiffs continued to argue that although St. Alo-
ysius was its own corporate entity, its veil should be pierced and
liability extended to RCB, who allegedly controlled the affairs of St.
Aloysius and allowed St. Aloysius to hold itself out as an agency of
the diocese. 28 The supreme court acknowledged that although the
criteria for corporate veil piercing is fact specific and varies with
the particular circumstances,29 a corporate entity will be disre-
garded only when it would be unjust and inequitable not to do so. 30
In order for liability to be imposed upon the parent corporation in a
parent-subsidiary relationship, the evidence presented by the
plaintiffs, in the totality of the circumstances, must demonstrate
"'that the parent dominated the finances, policies, and practices of
the subsidiary."' 31 However, if two corporations are connected by
way of common-stock ownership, each corporation will be
respected as its own until the totality of circumstances and evi-
dence presented indicate that one is being controlled and organized
by the other so that it is merely an agent of the controlling
corporation.32
The court held that there was not enough evidence demon-
strating RCB's significant involvement or control over St. Aloysius
to hold it liable.33 The corporate veil of St. Aloysius will not be
pierced to hold RCB liable for the mere fact that Bishop Gelineau
acted as the ecclesiastical head of the diocese and as the President,
Treasurer and Director of St. Aloysius. 34 Plaintiffs failed to prove
27. See id. at 45.
28. See id. at 48.
29. See id. (citing Miller v. Dixon Indus. Corp., 513 A.2d 597, 604 (R.I. 1986)).
30. See id. (quoting R & B Elec. Co. v. Amco Constr. Co., 471 A.2d 1351, 1354
(R.I. 1984); Vennerbeck & Clase Co. v. Juergens Jewelry Co., 164 A.2d 509, 510
(1933)).
31. Id. (quoting Miller, 513 A.2d at 604).
32. See id. at 48-49 (quoting Vucci v. Meyers Bros. Parking Sys., Inc., 494 A.2d
530, 536 (R.I. 1985) (quoting United Transit Co. v. Nunes, 209 A.2d 215, 219
(1965))).
33. See id. at 49.
34. See id. (citing Richfood, Inc. v. Jennings, 499 S.E.2d 272, 276 (Va. 1998);
Landry v. St. Charles Inn, Inc, 446 So. 2d 1246, 1251 (La. Ct. App. 1984); Cluster
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that RCB, through Bishop Gelineau, controlled St. Aloysius to the
extent that it was a mere agent or instrumentality of RCB.35 Fur-
thermore, the record provided no indication that when Bishop Ge-
lineau acted for St. Aloysius, he was acting under the guise of
RCB.36
Plaintiffs attempted to present further evidence of RCB's al-
leged control of St. Aloysius. To this end, plaintiffs provided evi-
dence that a multi-million dollar insurance policy had been issued
in the name of the Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence, not
RCB. 37 The defendants submitted testimony that the Roman
Catholic Bishop of Providence kept records of the various insur-
ance policies that St. Aloysius held.38 The defense also conceded
that the insurance policy provided defense and liability coverage
for St. Aloysius and Bishop Gelineau. 39 The supreme court held
that the information regarding the insurance policy was immate-
rial as to whether or not RCB controlled St. Aloysius because
plaintiffs failed to present any evidence of the significance of the
policy as it relates to RCB and RCB's control over St. Aloysius.40
The plaintiffs also produced some of St. Aloysius' personnel
policies issued in the name of the diocese. 41 However, defendants
testified that St. Aloysius had its own policy manual that governed
its relationship with its employees and staff. 42 Plaintiffs submit-
ted this manual and other documents, such as the report of alleged
abuse at St. Aloysius, into evidence, but failed to prove that these
items were ever sent to the diocese or RCB.43 Although it was de-
termined that St. Aloysius sent to the diocesan officials an annual
independent financial audit and proposals for changes to its per-
sonnel manual, the court found that none of the facts provided any
proof of RCB's control of St. Aloysius, and thus potential liability
for the acts committed there. 4
Builders, Inc. v. Quaker Heritage, Inc., 344 N.Y.S.2d 606, 609 (N.Y. App. Div.
1973)).
35. See id. (citing Vucci, 494 A.2d at 536).
36. See id. at 49-50.







44. See id. at 51.
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Finally, the plaintiffs attempted to show RCB's control of St.
Aloysius by pointing to the fact that Bishop Gelineau was the pub-
lisher of the Providence Visitor.45 The Providence Visitor is a
newspaper which establishes itself as the voice of the diocese and
has documented some of Bishop Gelineau's involvement with the
management of St. Aloysius. 46 Once again, the court noted that
this evidence was insufficient to link RCB with the affairs of St.
Aloysius.47 There was no evidence of financial support by RCB.
Furthermore, RCB submitted evidence that St. Aloysius and the
state, via DCYF, had entered into contracts for the care of plain-
tiffs.As RCB was not a party to these contracts. Under these facts,
there was insufficient proof that RCB, through Bishop Gelineau,
controlled the finances, management and/ or operations of St. Alo-
ysius. 49 Nor was there any evidence that the court should pierce
the corporate veil in order to prevent an injustice.50
CONCLUSION
A corporation sole may be subject to veil piercing liability, pro-
vided that the totality of circumstances and evidence presented by
the plaintiffs support such an outcome. Evidence must be submit-
ted that the parent corporation so dominated the operations of the
subsidiary that it is inequitable to recognize the latter's separate
corporate entity. If enough evidence is presented, a corporation
sole may be liable for conduct outside of its statutorily sanctioned









Corporate Law. McCrory v. Spigel, 740 A.2d 1274 (R.I. 1999). In
a case operating under the principles of indemnity, a showing of
negligence by the indemnitor, with the negligence causing harm to
the indemnitee, is not a necessary element under the theory of eq-
uitable indemnity.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In McCrory v. Spigel,1 the Rhode Island Supreme Court up-
held a superior court grant of summary judgment in favor of plain-
tiffs, Glenn and Ann McCrory (the McCrorys). 2 The McCrorys
brought suit, as owners of an automobile dealership, against the
defendant, Robert Spigel, for acting as an unauthorized agent of
their dealership. 3 The McCrorys' automobile dealership was li-
censed by the State of Rhode Island to service and sell
automobiles. 4 The dealership was known as Frenchtown Auto
Sales (Frenchtown). 5 The McCrorys first came into contact with
the defendant in 1993, when they entered into an oral agreement
whereby the McCrorys would rent space in the service department
of their business to the defendant.6 In return, the defendant would
service the vehicles individually, and "eventually under the corpo-
rate name of A Smiling Mr. Bob Enterprises, Inc. (Smiling Mr.
Bob)."7 The oral agreement also provided the defendant with a
commission on any vehicle he sold on the Frenchtown lot or at auc-
tion that was owned by Frenchtown.8
However, problems arose when defendant agreed to purchase
vehicles from his nephew in New York.9 After determining that he
would make a profit from selling the automobiles, the defendant
contacted his nephew in order to arrange the purchase.10 Defend-
ant claimed he checked the vehicle identification numbers with the
police department in order to be certain that the vehicles were not
1. 740 A.2d 1274 (R.I. 1999).
2. See id at 1275.
3. See id. at 1276.
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stolen." Defendant's nephew delivered three vehicles: two were
sold to Apollo Auto Sales in Cumberland and the third was sold to
Tarbox South County Toyota in North Kingstown.12 The Toyota 4-
Runner was sold to Tarbox for $18,000.13 The defendant gave
$14,000 of the sale price to his nephew. 14
Defendant subsequently received a telephone call from an em-
ployee at Apollo Auto Sales indicating that the cars sold to them by
the defendant were stolen. 15 Defendant retrieved the cars from
Apollo and refunded the amount paid to him by the dealership. 16
Defendant claimed he then contacted Tarbox and the Rhode Island
State Police and informed them that the vehicle he had sold to the
dealership was stolen. 17 Defendant, however, never reimbursed
Tarbox the money that the dealership had paid for the Toyota 4-
Runner.18
The McCrorys were contacted by the Rhode Island Motor Vehi-
cle Dealers Commission and were told "a stolen vehicle had been
sold using their license number."19 The McCrorys filed suit
against defendant in June of 1997 in order to collect the money
owed to Tarbox.20 They claimed that defendant "unlawfully used
their license number and held himself out as an agent of French-
town to sell automobiles that Spigel knew or should have known
were stolen."21 The superior court granted the McCrorys' motion
for summary judgment seeking indemnification based on the the-
ory of equitable right of indemnity, indicating that defendant
would be "potentially liable to Tarbox for conveying stolen goods, if








17. See id. at 1275-76.








Defendant's first argument on appeal stated that the Mc-
Crorys erred in bringing suit against him as an individual because
the suit should have been filed against the corporate entity of Smil-
ing Mr. Bob.23 Only after bringing suit against the corporation
and successfully piercing the corporate veil could the McCrorys
bring suit against defendant as an individual.2 4 The Rhode Island
Supreme Court disagreed, however, finding that the McCrorys'
claim against defendant was appropriate. 25 The court evaluated
the agreement between the McCrorys and defendant in two dis-
tinct parts: the leasing agreement that allowed defendant to repair
vehicles as a corporation and the agreement *that permitted de-
fendant, as an individual, to sell automobiles for the McCrorys'
dealership. 26 Smiling Mr. Bob, the corporation, was not author-
ized to sell cars nor was it licensed by the state to act in such a
capacity. 27 Consequently, the court held that there was no corpo-
rate veil that needed to be pierced in order to reach the defendant
since it was the defendant, as an individual, who contracted to sell
automobiles for Frenchtown. 2s
Indemnity
Defendant also argued that allowing the McCrorys to recover
under the theory of equitable indemnity was an error by the trial
justice.29 The trial justice applied the required elements of equita-
ble indemnification and found that each was satisfied, thus leaving
summary judgment, in favor of the McCrorys, as the only appropri-
ate resolution.30 The three elements necessary to recover on the
theory of equitable indemnity include: "first, the party seeking in-
demnity must be liable to a third party; second, the prospective
indemnitor must also be liable to the third party; and third, as be-
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ought to be discharged by the indemnitor."31 Defendant claimed
that the third element was absent in the present case and that the
McCrorys should have demonstrated that their injury was caused
by the negligence of the defendant in order to show that the third
element was successfully proven.32 The Rhode Island Supreme
Court, however, disagreed with defendant's contention and agreed
with the trial justice's finding that the third element was pres-
ent.33 In doing so, the court found it clear that the McCrorys were
innocent victims since they neither saw the automobile in question
nor knew of any transaction that took place in relation to the
vehicle.34
CONCLUSION
In McCrory v. Spigel, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held
that the plaintiffs correctly brought suit against the defendant as
an individual and did not need to prove negligence, with damage
resulting from that negligence, in order to properly recover for
losses incurred under the theory of equitable indemnity.
Danielle T. Jenkins
31. Id. at 1276-77 (quoting Muldowney v. Weatherking Prod., Inc., 509 A.2d
441, 443 (R.I. 1986)).
32. See id. at 1277.
33. See id.
34. See id.
